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LABOR LAW-NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD JURISDICTION-
LEGAL SERVICES HAVE INSUFFICIENT EFFECT ON INTERSTATE COM-
MERCE TO JUSTIFY EXERCISE OF NLRB JURISDICTION-Bodle, Fogel,
Julber, Reinhardt & Rothschild, 206 N.L.R.B. No. 60, CCH 1973
LAB. L. REP. 25,863 (October 23, 1973).
Last October, in Bodle, Fogel, Julber, Reinhardt & Rothschild,' the
National Labor Relations Board ("the Board") refused to assert juris-
diction over the non-professional employees of a law firm.' Pursuant
to section 14(c)(1) of the National Labor Relations Act ("the Act"),
a majority of the Board held that the services provided by law firms
as a general class have no more than a minimal effect on interstate
commerce.4  Further, the majority felt that the confidentiality of the
lawyer-client relationship would be imperiled by the unionization of
1. 206 N.L.R.B. No. 60, CCH 1973 LAB. L. REP. 1 25,863 (October 23, 1973).
2. Id. at -, CCH 1973 LAi. L REP. at 33,340.
3. Section 14(c) (1) states:
The Board, in its discretion, may, by rule of decision or by published rules adopted
pursuant to the Administrative Procedure Act, decline to assert jurisdiction over
any labor dispute involving any class or category of employers, where, in the opin-
ion of the Board, the effect of such labor dispute on commerce is not sufficiently
substantial to warrant the exercise of its jurisdiction: Provided, That the Board
shall not decline to assert jurisdiction over any labor dispute over which it would
assert jurisdiction under the standards prevailing upon August 1, 1959.
29 U.S.C. § 164(c)(1) (1970).
Prior to the passage of this section in September, 1959, the Board had established
minimum monetary jurisdictional standards under which it could refuse to assert juris-
diction. Attempting to further effectuate the policies of the Act, the Board, in
October, 1958, revised these standards downward to require at least $50,000 direct
inflow or direct outflow annually for an assertion of jurisdiction. See Siemons
Mailing Serv., 122 N.L.R.B. 81, 82-85 (1958).
Congress then passed, in September, 1959, the Labor Management Reporting and
Disclosure Act which added section 14(c) (1) and (2) to the Labor Management Re-
lations Act of 1947 (Taft-Hartley Act), thereby allowing the Board to exercise discre-
tion in declining to assert jurisdiction over an entire class or category of employers
and approving the Board's newly-adopted minimum jurisdictional standards but disal-
lowing future increases of such minimums. Section 14(c) (2) was adopted to allow
other agencies and courts the statutory right to assert jurisdiction where the Board has
declined to do so and thus eliminate the "no-man's land" sanctioned in Guss v. Utah
Labor Relations Bd., 353 U.S. 1, 10-12 (1957) and Amalgamated Meatcutters v. Fair-
lawn Meats, Inc., 353 U.S. 20, 23-24 (1957). Section 14(c) (2) states:
Nothing in this subsection shall be deemed to prevent or bar any agency or the
courts of any State or Territory (including the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico,
Guam, and the Virgin Islands), from assuming and asserting jurisdiction over la-
bor disputes over which the Board declines, pursuant to paragraph (1) of this sub-
section, to assert jurisdiction.
29 U.S.C. § 164(c)(2) (1970).
4. 206 N.L.R.B. at -, CCH 1973 LAB. L. RP. at 33,340.
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a firm's clerical employees 5 and that, in any event, jurisdictional stand-
ards of general application would be "extraordinarily difficult both to
devise and to administer."
The defendant law firm specialized in the practice of labor law, rep-
resenting numerous AFL-CIO local and international unions in the
Southern California area.7 A Teamsters union local sought to rep-
resent the firm's clerical staff (nine secretaries, two receptionists, and
one bookkeeper)s and petitioned the Board for a union representation
election.9 The Board denied the Teamsters' request, announcing that,
although it possessed the clear statutory authority to assert jurisdiction,
it chose not to do so since "the policies of the Act would not be effec-
tuated" by such a course of action.10
5. Id. at-, CCH 1973 LAB. L. REP. at 33,341.
6. Id.
7. Id. at -, CCH 1973 LAB. L. REP. at 33,339.
8. Brief for Respondents at 9, Bodle, Fogel, Julber, Reinhardt & Rothschild, 206
N.L.R.B. No. 60, CCH 1973 LAB. L. REP. % 25,863 (October 23, 1973) [hereinafter
cited as Respondents' Brief]. An associate attorney is also considered a salaried "law
employee," but the local Teamsters union did not attempt to include the seven associates
of the law firm in the proposed bargaining unit. See note 44 infra.
9. The local Teamsters union petitioned the Board under Section 9(c) (1) (A) (i) of
the Taft-Hartley Act which provides:
Whenever a petition shall have been filed, in accordance with such regulations
as may be prescribed by the Board-
(A) by an employee or group of employees or any individual or labor organiza-
tion acting in their behalf alleging that a substantial number of employees (i) wish
to be represented for collective bargaining and that their employer declines to rec-
ognize their representative as the representative defined in subsection (a) of this
section,.
the Board shall investigate such petition and if it has reasonable cause to believe
that a question of representation affecting commerce exists shall provide for an
appropriate hearing upon due notice. Such hearing may be conducted by an offi-
cer or employee of the regional office, who shall not make any recommendations
with respect thereto. If the Board finds upon the record of such hearing that
such a question of representation exists, it shall direct an election by secret ballot
and certify the results thereof.
29U.S.C. § 159(c) (1970).
10. 206 N.L.R.B. at -, CCH 1973 LAB. L. REP. at 33,339. Sections 2(6) and (7)
of the Act state:
(6) The term "commerce" means trade, traffic, commerce, transportation, or
communication among the several States, or between the District of Columbia or
any Territory of the United States and any State or other Territory, or between
any foreign country and any State, Territory, or the District of Columbia, or
within the District of Columbia or any Territory, or between points in the same
State but through any other State or any Territory or the District of Columbia
or any foreign country.
29 U.S.C. § 152(6) (1970).
(7) The term "affecting commerce" means in commerce, or burdening or obstruct-
ing commerce or the free flow of commerce, or having led or tending to lead to
a labor dispute burdening or obstructing commerce or the free flow of commerce.
29 U.S.C. § 152(7) (1970).
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MINIMAL EFFECT ON INTERSTATE COMMERCE
It was stipulated that the employer firm annually grossed more than
$50,000 for legal services furnished to clients who met the Board's
jurisdictional standards." However, the majority stated that neither
the total income of the firm nor the amount attributable to interstate
clients could in any way control the decision as to whether or not
jurisdiction should be asserted. 12  The major consideration was to
be "whether the stoppage of business by reason of labor strife [in
a law firm] would tend substantially to affect [interstate] com-
merce.)
13
The Board recognized that a client's production, distribution, buy-
ing, and selling of goods and services could substantially affect inter-
state commerce.' 4 It was also admitted that:
[Today's law firms . . . frequently assist large corporate entities, la-
bor unions, and other institutional entities in their interstate commerce
activity. Thus, the guiding hand of the lawyer can, and in many in-
stances does, assist in the negotiation and ultimate formulation of com-
plex interstate agreements relating to trade and business.' 5
Yet, the majority characterized an attorney as a mere "helper" to the
client who alone functions as the "principal,"' 6 "the moving force in
commerce. ' 1'  Thus, "no matter in how high esteem that legal assist-
11. 206 N.L.R.B. at--, CCH 1973 LAB. L. REP. at 33,339.
12. Id. at -, CCH 1973 LAB. L. REP. at 33,340. The parties also stipulated that
the total income of the employer law firm was in excess of $500,000. Id. at -, CCH
1973 LAn. L. REP. at 33,339.
13. Id. at -, CCH 1973 LAB. L. REP. at 33,340, quoting Service Stores Corp., 62
N.L.R.B. 1161-63 (1945). See also, J.L. Brandeis & Sons v. NLRB, 142 F.2d 977,
980 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 323 U.S. 751 (1944), enforcing 53 N.L.R.B. 352 (1943).
Although the two cases cited support the language quoted by the majority, the Board
in both cases had asserted jurisdiction notwithstanding the fact that the service was
primarily local in nature. The Board in Bodle could apparently cite no case where
jurisdiction was denied, or an insufficient impact on interstate commerce found, regard-
ing an employer who provided extensive services for other employers who themselves
met the Board's jurisdictional guidelines. 206 N.L.R.B. at -, CCH 1973 LAB. L. REP.
at 33,342 n.3. But see Seattle Real Estate Bd., 130 N.L.R.B. 608 (1961), where the
Board declined to assert jurisdiction over real estate agents because "the services ren-
dered [were] primarily at the local level, and [were] therefore essentially local and
have at best only a remote relationship to interstate commerce . . . ." Id. at 610.
However, the services of a real estate agent who buys and sells land for an interstate
client does not appear materially distinguishable from the many other services over
which the Board has consistently asserted jurisdiction. Thus, Seattle Real Estate Board
may be an aberration. See note 32 infra and accompanying text.
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ance might be held,""' the majority thought it highly unlikely that
a labor conflict in a law firm could substantially impede or interrupt
the client's interstate business." In short, the majority concluded that
the very nature of legal services precluded any but the most minimal
effect on interstate commerce.20
The decision, however, was based on two closely interrelated prem-
ises, each of which appears untenable. Apparently the majority as-
sumed that, once a client's commercial mechanism is functioning in
interstate commerce, legal assistance is not essential to the continuation
of its operation."' This clearly overlooks the fact that
[t]he legal profession plays a vital role at all stages [of a client's busi-
ness] from the act of incorporation through the obtaining of licenses
or certificates which might be needed, governmental approval of rates
and/or routes, the issuance and sale of stocks and bonds, the negotia-
tions and preparation of legal contracts necessary for the holding of prop-
erty, and the purchase and sale of materials and products .... 22
Recent escalation in the quantity of corporate litigation and the con-
comitant danger of large awards in class action suits23 demonstrate
that it is much "more realistic to say that without . . . [legal] services
. . .clients would be unable to engage in .. . [interstate] commerce
",24 The risk of incurring liability while temporarily unrepre-
sented would certainly force industrial clients to restrict their participa-
tion in interstate commerce until their legal counsel was again avail-
able.25 Such a forced limitation of commercial activities to the scope
safely established through the prior assistance of counsel would seem,
beyond question, to affect commerce.2 6
18. Id. at -, CCH 1973 LAB. L. REP. at 33,341.
19. Id. at -, CCH 1973 LAB. L. REP. at 33,340-41.
20. Id. See notes 11-19 supra and accompanying text.
21. 206 N.L.R.B. at -, CCH 1973 LAB. L. REP. at 33, 340-41.
22. Id. at -, CCH 1973 LAB. L. RaP. at 33,342 (emphasis added).
23. See Caruth, The Legal Explosion Has Left Business Shell-Shocked, FORTUNE,
Apr. 1973, at 64. The article also listed the types and numbers of law suits filed
against corporate entities in federal district court for the last six years.
1966 1968 1970 1972
Environmental issues - 42 140 268
Fair-employment practices - - - 1,015
Anti-trust 480 707 929 1,379
Patents, Copyrights, and
Trademarks 1,832 1,829 2,150 2,194
Labor Law 3,336 3,518 3,999 4,987
Id.
24. 206 N.L.R.B. at -, CCH 1973 LAB. L. REP. at 33,342 (emphasis added).
25. Id.
26. See, e.g., Guss v. Utah Labor Relations Bd., 353 U.S. 1, 3 n.4 (1957); NLRB
v. Fainblatt, 306 U.S. 601, 606-09, modified, 307 U.S. 609 (1939).
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Even accepting, arguendo, the proposition 'that the availability of
legal services plays no part in the continued operation of established
interstate commercial mechanisms, one must inquire as to the role
of the attorney in their establishment. The majority asserted that "no
matter in how high esteem . . . legal assistance [may] be held," 27 a
client would enter interstate commerce with or without prior counsel-
ing.28  This assertion was required since to admit that the temporary
unavailability of legal counsel would postpone client participation in
interstate commerce would be to admit the appreciable, if indirect,
impact of attorneys. Clearly, law firms do "have [a substantial] im-
pact on how, where, and when a business may operate."2 9  Or, as
the majority carelessly admitted, a client "doubtless consults its law-
yers" before entering interstate commerce. 0  To assume that prior
legal assistance does not measurably affect client entrance into inter-
state commerce is thus to ignore the realities of commercial practice. 1
The Board was also faced with the fact that jurisdiction has been
repeatedly asserted over providers of intangible services whose impact
upon the flow of interstate commerce appears as "incidental" and "in-
direct" as that of the legal profession.3 2  The majority, however, con-
cluded that engineering, architectural, or advertising firms provide
"services relat[ed] directly to commerce - i.e., manufacturing, con-
27. 206 N.L.R.B. at -, CCH 1973 LAB. L. REP. at 33,341.
28. Id.
29. Id. at -, CCH 1973 LAB. L. REP. at 33,342.
30. Id. at -, CCH 1973 LAB. L. RnrP. at 33,340 (emphasis added).
31. See text accompanying notes 26-30 supra.
32. See, e.g., Truman Schlup, Consulting Eng'r, 145 N.L.R.B. 768 (1963) (engineer-
ing and surveying services); Browne & Buford, Eng'rs & Surveyors, 145 N.L.R.B. 765
(1963) (surveying, design, and inspection services); Hazelton Laboratories, Inc., 136
N.L.R.B. 1609 (1962) (research and development services); Gray, Rogers, Graham &
Osborne, 129 N.L.R.B. 450 (1960) (architecture, engineering, and surveying); In re
De Leuw, Cather & Co., 72 N.L.R.B. 191 (1947) (appraisal, investigation, and surveys
of property); In re The Austin Co., 70 N.L.R.B. 851 (1946) (branch engineer-
ing, office making layouts, and blueprint specifications); In re Electrical Testing Lab-
oratories, Inc., 65 N.L.R.B. 1239 (1946) (testing of electrical products); In re Franque
A. Dickins, Eng'r, 64 N.L.R.B. 797 (1945) (engineering services); In re Salmon &
Cowin, Inc., 57 N.L.R.B. 845 (1944) (appraisal of mining property); In re WJ. Coch-
rane, 44 N.L.R.B. 617 (1942) (assaying and analyzing lead and zinc ores); In re
United States Testing Co., 5 N.L.R.B. 696 (1938) (chemical and physical analysis of
industrial commodities).
In addition, the Board must consider all law firms in determining the class' impact
on interstate commerce and not base an exemption of all employers on an examination
of a single law firm that is of medium size. See NLRB v. Reliance Fuel Oil Corp.,
371 U.S. 224, 226-27 (1963); Polish Nat'l Alliance v. NLRB, 322 U.S. 643, 648
(1944); NLRB v. Fainblatt, 306 U.S. 601, 607-08 (1939). See note 13 supra.
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struction, and sales activity, '33 while the attorney's primary function
is "relate[d] to law, not commerce or commercial activity. ' 34  Of
course, this semantic choice, as to what the service is deemed to relate,
begs the question. Is the service a condition precedent in the client's
mind to his commercial activity? If so, as is obviously the case as
regards legal counsel, the service markedly affects that activity.3"
The majority also felt that the infrequency with which jurisdiction
is requested by clerical legal employees somehow threw light on the
profession's impact on interstate commerce.8 6  This neglects the ob-
vious fact that such an infrequency is at best a rough barometer of
the general satisfaction of legal employees with current employer labor
practices. Regardless, "it is within the province of the Board to pro-
tect and foster interstate commerce before actual industrial strife ma-
terializes to obstruct that commerce. ' 37  Furthermore, to assert juris-
diction over a general class of employers at the earliest possible mo-
ment effectuates the Act's dual policies of fostering employee organi-




The Board was also influenced by other considerations which it felt
mandated a denial of jurisdiction over law firms as a general class.
The majority sensed the difficulty in accommodating the collective bar-
gaining desires of legal employees "when such [a] unit must of neces-
sity include employees with access to information coming within the
peculiarly confidential relationship between lawyer and client."3' 9
However, this fear would only seem justified when the legal employees
"are. . . represented by, and owe a substantial loyalty to, an organiza-
tion which may well have interests conflicting with those of clients
whom the lawyers represent.140  In Bodle, the Board maintained that
33. 206 N.L.R.B. at--, CCH 1973 LAB. L. REP. at 33,340.
34. Id.
35. See text accompanying notes 22-24 supra.
36. 206 N.L.R.B. at -, CCH 1973 LAB. L. REP. at 33,341.
37. NLRB v. Davis Motors, Inc., 192 F.2d 782, 783 (10th Cir. 1951).
38. At least one author has stated that the primary purpose of the Act is the statu-
tory recognition of the right of employees to exert economic pressure on their employ-
ers. See Getman, The Protection of Economic Pressure by Section 7 of the National
Labor Relations Act, 115 U. PA. L. Rav. 1195-97 (1967). See also Labor Man-
agement Relations Act of 1947 §§ 7, 8, 29 U.S.C. §§ 157, 158 (1970). See note 10
infra and accompanying text.




clients of the' firm in question (e.g., the AFL-CIO) "compete with
and engage in rival or even adverse activity" with the union (Team-
sters) which sought to represent the legal employees.41  But the
particular local involved had not been previously involved in a la-
bor dispute with any client of the firm.42 Moreover, the speculative
fear that the Teamsters local might subsequently become embroiled
in a dispute with a union represented by the employer could hardly
outweigh a present need for balanced collective bargaining. 43
Admittedly, a conflict of interest might arise if a union were to rep-
resent the clerical employees of a firm whose clients included corpora-
tions or other unions which have or might have dealings with the rep-
resentative union. But exclusion from the Act's coverage would then
seem to apply at most to a rather -limited class of legal employers,
including the defendant in Bodle, but not to all law firms as a general
class.44
The justification for even such a partial exclusion would require the
assumption that employees aware of the activities of the firm's client
would divulge confidential information to their union. Such an as-
sumption calls into question the employees' personal integrity, loyalty
to their firm and to their jobs.45 Even if this assumption were appro-
41. Id.
42. Respondents' Brief, supra note 8, at 26.
43. See notes 37-38 supra and accompanying text. Even assuming such an embroil-
ment, the Teamsters disclaimed any intention of procuring information from the law
employees, except, that which is relevant to their position as bargaining agent. Pro-
ceedings Before the NLRB, No. 31-RC-2180, at 61, 66 (Aug. 22, 1972).
44. In 1972 the Board declined to assert jurisdiction over an Arizona law firm of
four to six attorneys with a relatively smaller gross income than the law firm in Bodle.
Evans & Kunz, Ltd., 194 N.L.R.B. 1216 (1972); In Evans, the Board expressly stated
that its decision was limited solely to the piariibular facts of that case and was not
an expression of Board opinion as to law firms as a general class of employers. Id;
The Board, in.two instances prior to Evans, had ruled that attorneys are covered
by the Act. In Lumberman's Mut. Cas. Co., 75 N.L.R.B. 1132 (1948), the Board
allowed the unionization of a group of attorneys working in the legal department of
an insurance company without ever considering the conflict of interest problem. It
must be:observed, however-, that these attorneys.were governed by a single client-em-
ployer relationship. Additionally, they possessed narrow responsibilities and exercised
limited discretion under the direction of a supervising attorney and were' closely regu-
lated by the employer. Id. at 1134-35. The other Board decision dealing with the
unionization of attorneys was Syracuse Univ., 204 N.L.R.B. No.'85,.CCH 1973 LAB.
L. REP. ff 25,517 (June 29, 1973), which dealt extensively with the issue of whether
law professors can constitute a separate bargaining unit under the Act. "[We have
recognized that [the law] faculty, whatever the differences, . . . have a legitimate in-
terest under the Act in their terms and conditions [of employment]." 1d. at -, CCH
1973 LAW. L. REP. at 32,887. ..
45. Bodle, Fogel, Julber, Reinhardt & Rothschild, D-7233, official opinion at 16:18
1974]
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priate, exclusion would not necessarily be justified, for if an employee
were to divulge confidential or privileged information, "the remedy for
. . .neglect of duty, collusion, or other improper conduct on the part
of. . .employees ... lies in the power of the [ejmployer to discipline
or discharge." 46
Mere access to confidential information is not a sufficient basis to deny
legal employees the benefits of the Act nor to preclude them from
exercising their statutory right to bargain collectively with respect to
employment conditions in law firms.47  "[T]he Board has often held
that there is no incompatibility between faithful performance of duty
and the enjoyment of benefits under the Act."4 s
JURISDICTIONAL STANDARDS
The final concern expressed by the majority was the hardship envis-
ioned in the establishment of jurisdictional standards of general appli-
cation for law firms. 49 "[Tihe problems involved in -attempting to es-
tablish any reasonable jurisdictional yardsticks of general application
would be extraordinarily difficult both to devise and to administer." 0
Admittedly, such standards might be difficult to formulate, but, how-
ever difficult, "the statute compels the task,' ' 1 and there exists no
reason why a reasonable standard could not be formulated. 2
A firm's total income could well reflect merely the representation
of a large number of wholly local interests and would be inappropriate
as a general standard for determining the effect on interstate com-
merce. 53 Likewise, a standard based on the amount of the firm's in-
come derived from interstate clients would not be generally appro-
priate since "any impact on commerce alleged to result from a law
firm's activity would . . . arise out of the nature of the law firm's
activity rather than the amount of its income therefore."54
Instead, the Board should focus solely on the business activities
of the clients represented. If a client falls within the Board's estab-
(portion of dissent not published in loose-leaf service report, on file at LOyola of Los
Angeles Law Review Office) [hereinafter cited as Dissent].
46. In re Art Metal Constr. Co., 75 N.L.R.B. 80, 82 (1947).
47. See Phillips Oil Co., 91 N.L.R.B. 534 (1950).
48. E.I. DuPont DeNemours & Co., 107 N.L.R.B. 734, 744 (1954).
49. 206 N.L.R.B. at -, CCH 1973 LAB. L. REP. at 33,341.
50. Id.
51. Local 761, Elec. Radio & Mach. Workers v. NLRB, 366 U.S. 667, 674 (1961),
52. Dissent, supra note 45, at 19.




lished criterion of "affecting commerce"55 and, therefore, within the
Act's coverage, legal services utilized in furtherance of that commerce
should logically and appropriately be also subject to the Board's juris-
diction, regardless of aggregate amount.58 Thus, only those firms




The National Labor Relations Board's analysis that legal services
play a purely incidental role in the affairs of interstate commerce is
both logically and legally untenable. Further, the holding is undesir-
able in that it denies legal employees their statutory right to exert col-
lective economic pressure as a counterbalance to their employers'
power over employment conditions. By forcing legal employees to
rely exclusively on their own individual influence for productive nego-
tiations with their employer firms, the Board has not only denied them
their statutory right to the added power of collective bargaining, but
has guaranteed that their bargaining power will remain relatively
minuscule.
Robert D. Vogel
55. See note 10 supra.
56. See notes 24-25, 53-55 supra and accompanying text.
57. Dissent, supra note 45, at 18-19.
1974]
